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keyissues:algebra_of_pleasure [2023/07/03 15:37] cassiusamicuskeyissues:algebra_of_pleasure [2023/07/03 15:37] (current) cassiusamicus
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-====== Hu's On First ====== +====== Hu's On First (The Algebra of Pleasure) ======
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-=====   The Algebra of Pleasure   =====+
  
 Epicurus famously includes a statement n his letter to Menoeceus that is translated as "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain." The purpose of this article is to evaluate that statement in light of three passages relating to pleasure given in Cicero's On Ends: the challenge of Chrysippus' Hand,((On Ends Book One, XI, And even at Athens, as I have heard my father say, when he was jesting in a good-humoured and facetious way upon the Stoics, there is a statue in the Ceramicus of Chrysippus, sitting down with his hand stretched out; and this attitude [pg 112] of the hand intimates that he is amusing himself with this brief question, “Does your hand, while in that condition in which it is at present, want anything?”—Nothing at all. But if pleasure were a good, would it want it? I suppose so. Pleasure, then, is not a good. And my father used to say that even a statue would not say this if it could speak. For the conclusion was drawn as against the Stoics with sufficient acuteness, but it did not concern Epicurus. For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.))  the sarcastic comparison of the pleasure of the Pouring Host to that of the Drinking Guest,((On Ends Book Two, V - "Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?"))  and the sweeping assertion by Torquatus that all men who are not in pain are at the height of pleasure.((On Ends Book Two, V - "What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. ")) Epicurus famously includes a statement n his letter to Menoeceus that is translated as "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain." The purpose of this article is to evaluate that statement in light of three passages relating to pleasure given in Cicero's On Ends: the challenge of Chrysippus' Hand,((On Ends Book One, XI, And even at Athens, as I have heard my father say, when he was jesting in a good-humoured and facetious way upon the Stoics, there is a statue in the Ceramicus of Chrysippus, sitting down with his hand stretched out; and this attitude [pg 112] of the hand intimates that he is amusing himself with this brief question, “Does your hand, while in that condition in which it is at present, want anything?”—Nothing at all. But if pleasure were a good, would it want it? I suppose so. Pleasure, then, is not a good. And my father used to say that even a statue would not say this if it could speak. For the conclusion was drawn as against the Stoics with sufficient acuteness, but it did not concern Epicurus. For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.))  the sarcastic comparison of the pleasure of the Pouring Host to that of the Drinking Guest,((On Ends Book Two, V - "Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?"))  and the sweeping assertion by Torquatus that all men who are not in pain are at the height of pleasure.((On Ends Book Two, V - "What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. "))
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 It seems to me that a grasp of Epicurus' view that the normal state of life is pleasure serves as a critically important tool for emulating "the gods" which allows us to "live as gods among men." The most desirable state for both gods and men is that of continuous /sustained pleasure.((U116 Plutarch, Against Colotes, 17, p. 1117A: Such is … the man who, in in the letter to Anaxarchus can pen such words as these: “But I, for my part, summon you to sustained pleasures and not to empty virtues, which fill us with vain expectations that destroy peace of mind.”))   This attitude would explain why Torquatus so tenaciously holds to the formulaic / algebraic approach in the face of challenge after challenge from Cicero. This perspective is far too important to become muddied by implication that "absence of pain" constitutes a higher type of pleasure that is different in kind from any other type of pleasure that we ordinarily recognize through perception of the senses to be pleasurable. Understanding the nature and use of this formula allows us to have confidence that it is Pleasure, rather than supernatural gods or the idealistic Platonists or Humanists, that determines what is the best life. It seems to me that a grasp of Epicurus' view that the normal state of life is pleasure serves as a critically important tool for emulating "the gods" which allows us to "live as gods among men." The most desirable state for both gods and men is that of continuous /sustained pleasure.((U116 Plutarch, Against Colotes, 17, p. 1117A: Such is … the man who, in in the letter to Anaxarchus can pen such words as these: “But I, for my part, summon you to sustained pleasures and not to empty virtues, which fill us with vain expectations that destroy peace of mind.”))   This attitude would explain why Torquatus so tenaciously holds to the formulaic / algebraic approach in the face of challenge after challenge from Cicero. This perspective is far too important to become muddied by implication that "absence of pain" constitutes a higher type of pleasure that is different in kind from any other type of pleasure that we ordinarily recognize through perception of the senses to be pleasurable. Understanding the nature and use of this formula allows us to have confidence that it is Pleasure, rather than supernatural gods or the idealistic Platonists or Humanists, that determines what is the best life.
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  • keyissues/algebra_of_pleasure.txt
  • Last modified: 2023/07/03 15:37
  • by cassiusamicus